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CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AS PARING TOOL:
THE STRUGGLE FOR "RELEVANT" EVIDENCE
IN UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V GARRETT

Pamela Brandwein*
This Article examines the difficulties involved in translatingthe social model of
disability into the idiom of constitutionallaw. The immediatefocus is University
of Alabama v. Garrett. Both parts of this Article consider how disability rights
claims collide with a discourseof legitimacy in constitutional law. Part Ifocuses
on the arguments presented in several major Briefs filed in support of Garrett.
Constitutional doctrines are conceived as paring tools and it is shown how the
Court used these doctrines to easily pare down the body of evidence Garrett'slawyers sought to claim as relevant in justifying the ADA as Section 5 legislation.
Among these doctrines are state sovereign immunity, state action, and disparate
treatment. PartII examines how the language of equality, rights, and discrimination is used in a segment of the pre-Garrett disabilityliterature.A contrast in the
work of legal and non-legal academics is identified, namely, that legal academics
tend to identify, to a much greater extent, the elements of the constitutionallandscape that are inhospitable to constitutionalclaims to reasonableaccommodation.

What does the sociology of constitutional law have to contribute
to discussion about the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?1
The sociology of constitutional law is a new area of inquiry and
thus likely unfamiliar to members of the legal academy, much less
disability scholars outside of law schools. But this field, with its
origins in the sociology of knowledge, poses vital questions about
the social-historical processes of construction and persuasion entailed in the production of official constitutional knowledge.
Institutional analysis is central to the sociology of legal knowledge,
and this Article examines the nature of the institutional difficulties
involved in translating the social model of disability into the idiom

*

Associate Professor of Sociology and Government & Politics, University of Texas at

Dallas. BA 1986, University of Michigan; Ph.D. 1994, Northwestern University. I am grateful
to Douglas Dow for his helpful comments and suggestions.
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994)).
1.
See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
2.
COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999) (examining the history of the
canonical treatment of Fourteenth Amendment history by legal scholars and judges, including how this version survived even after it had been called into question by other
scholarship) [hereinafter BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTION]; see also Pamela Brandwein, Disciplinary Structures and 'Winning'Arguments in Law and Courts Scholarship, LAw & CTS., 11-19
(Summer 2000) [hereinafter Brandwein, Disciplinary Structures].
See BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 18-20.
3.
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of constitutional law. The Article's immediate focus is Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.'
This Article does not engage in traditional doctrinal analysis of
Garrett, nor is it a normative defense of Garrett's claims. Part I
focuses on the arguments presented in several major briefs filed in
support of Garrett5 and examines how Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, easily mobilized several branches of doctrine to render irrelevant most of the evidence gathered by
Garrett's attorneys.6 It is useful to imagine established constitutional doctrines as paring tools, for Rehnquist essentially used
these doctrines to pare down the body of evidence Garrett's lawyers sought to claim as relevant. An examination of the historical
contexts and institutional mechanisms that worked to authorize
the doctrines of state sovereign immunity, state action, and disparate treatment is beyond the scope of this Article, although such
an examination would be part of a more complete sociological inquiry into Rehnquist's opinion.
The focus here is the collision in Garrett between disability rights
claims and the discourse of legitimacy in constitutional law. Several
decades ago, disability activists built the social model of disability,
which was meant to displace the medical model.7 The social model
4.
531 U.S. 356 (2001). Respondents Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash filed separate
lawsuits seeking money damages from state employers under the ADA. "The question,
then," stated Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, "is whether Congress acted within
its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages under the ADA." 531 U.S. at 364. The Court concluded that Congress assembled
insufficient evidence of unconstitutional discrimination to warrant such suits. Id. at 373-74.
For a brief summary of the majority opinion, see Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric Mission 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31,105-07 (2001).
5.
Brief for Respondents Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash, Garrett (No. 99-1240)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondents]; Brief for the United States, Garrett, (No. 99-1240);
Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents, Garrett, (No. 99-1240)
[hereinafter Brief for Law Professors]; Brief of Morton Horwitz, Martha Field, Martha Minow and over 100 Other Historians and Scholars, Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Garrett,(No. 99-1240) [hereinafter Brief of Morton Horwitz et al.].
6.
Whether one conceives of judicial decision making along attitudinal lines, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993), rational choice institutional lines, see, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The
New Institutionalism,Part II, LAW & CTs., 4-9 (1997), or interpretive-historical lines, see, e.g.,
Howard Gillman, The New Institutionalism, Part I, LAw & CTS., 6-11 (1996), one needs an
understanding of how arrays of legal resources are authorized and mobilized in law. The
first part of this Article examines how the Rehnquist majority mobilized a powerful array of
resources to pare down the body of evidence claimed to be relevant by Garrett's supporters.
7.
See Robert L. BurgdorfJr., "SubstantiallyLimited" Protectionfrom DisabilityDiscrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L.
REv. 409, 522 (1997) ("A person may perform some mental or physical function in a way
that falls short of most other people, but the limitations imposed upon that individual frequently result as much from the social context as from the impaired function itself."); see
also ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
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of disability identifies contingent arrangements as the major
source of disadvantage for people with disabilities, while the medical model of disability identifies an individual's condition as the
major source of disadvantage.8 More recently, activists have used
this model to generate and justify claims for constitutional rights. 9
The discourse of legitimacy in constitutional law poses problems
for such claims. This discourse, made up of "meta" norms of persuasion and authority ° along with established doctrine, official
histories, and specific case law, makes it difficult to authorize
claims like those of Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash, the original
plaintiffs in Garrett." In other words, while disability activists strive
to translate the social model of disability into the idiom of constitutional law, the established constitutional context and the rules of
persuasion in constitutional law permit only a partial translation at
best. The established context includes the doctrines of state
JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

13, 75 (1998) [hereinafter SILVERS ET AL., DIsmodel of disability transforms the

ABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION] ("The social

notion of 'handicapping condition' from a state of a minority of people, which disadvan-

tages them in society, to a state of society, which disadvantages a minority of people. The
social model traces the source of this minority's disadvantage to a hostile environment and

treats the dysfunction attendant on (certain kinds of) impairment as artificial and remediable, not natural and immutable."). See generally RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (1984).

8.

See SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION,

supra note 7, at 59-76.

9.
In a classic law review article byJacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The
Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966), tenBroek used the social model of
disability to argue that rights for people with disabilities should be recognized under tort
law. Disability activists represented this article as a source of authority on the question of
constitutional rights. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE
LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS xiii-xiv (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers
eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS];
Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 514. In attempting to use tenBroek to argue questions of constitutional rights for people with disabilities, these activists have suppressed important
differences between rights under tort law (tenBroek's main concern) and those under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
10.
By "meta" norms I mean the duty to appeal to such things as text, legislative history, and doctrine to legitimate outcomes. These are the general channels that may be used
to gather sources of authority and establish legitimacy. The need to distinguish law from
politics, of course, is what impels such practice. To a large degree, the debate over which
legal methods are legitimate has been dominated by Herbert Wechsler's Toward Neutral
Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). For a useful typology of constitutional arguments, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-119 (1982). On the use of
doctrine, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). For an
argument that combines the doctrinal and historical approaches, see RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW's EMPIRE (1986). For a textualist perspective, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). See also the prudential approach of
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962).
11.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 1, 3.
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sovereign immunity, state action, formal equality, and disparate
treatment. This context is built mainly of "round holes" into which
the "square peg" features of the social model of disability do not fit.
In considering the nature of the constraints facing Garrett's attorneys, it is helpful to imagine a game of chess 2 wherein the black
king has been backed into a corner with only a few moves available
and only a few pieces to protect him. The weak positioning of the
black pieces-a product of the game being played over time-is
analogous to the position of Garrett's attorneys. Checkmate is not
the determined outcome on the next move, but the moves available to each of the black pieces are highly constrained. Garrett's
lawyers had only a few "degrees of freedom" within which to build
their argument, and even then their argument remained vulnerable. For Justices whose initial sense of the case favored the
University of Alabama, it was relatively easy to construct an argument using institutionally recognized rules and sources of
authority.
Indeed, the shorter length of the majority opinion, relative to
City of Boerne1 3 and KiMel, 4 is evidence of this ease.' 5

The chess analogy has its limits, of course. One limitation is that
in an actual game of chess, both sides begin at equal strength. Subsequent advantage of position is due to superior skill. As I intend
it, the disadvantaged position of Garrett's attorneys is not due to
inferior skill. Rather, it is due to the accumulated socially and historically contingent doctrines of state action, disparate treatment,
state sovereign immunity, etc., as well as the current institutional
dominance of the federalism vision of Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.

12.
Robert Cover used a chess analogy to illuminate the institutional situation of
judges. In examining claims of helplessness before the law by judges in slavery cases (the
judges asserted that the law rendered them helpless to produce anything but a pro-slavery
decision), Cover argued that law is not like chess, where the rules are fixed. Law is more like
language, where the rules evolve. A departure from the rules in chess makes the game "not
chess," but a departure in law is of uncertain status. Only future action, which might or
might not endorse the departure, can determine the status of departures. Thus, certain
departures can turn out to be "law" while others turn out to be "not law." See ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 123-30 (1975).
13.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
15.
The majority and concurring opinions in Garretttotaled about sixteen pages. Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-76 (2001). In City of Boerne, the majority and concurring
opinions totaled about thirty-three pages. 521 U.S. 507, 511-44 (1997). It is more difficult to
count pages in Kimel since Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part, 528 U.S. 62, 93-99 (2000).Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Kennedy) also filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Id. at 99-109. O'Connor's majority opinion is about 15 pages. Id. at 66-92.
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In short, the constitutional landscape imposed tight constraints
on Garrett's lawyers while offering an array of powerful legal resources for those who argued in favor of the University of
Alabama. It is vital to remember, however,
that doctrinal context
16
did not determine the outcome in Garrett.
This Article next treats the resource arrays mobilized by
Garrett's attorneys and by the Court majority as social-historical
products. These arrays, and the varying amounts of symbolic
power that attach to them, have been built, not found. A full articulation of the social-historical processes that established these
resource arrays is beyond the scope of this article. However,
enough evidence already exists to call the historical grounding of
both the state sovereign immunity and state action doctrines into
question, both of which imposed especially high hurdles for
Garrett's attorneys. While such evidence would likely be enough to
convince an audience in disability studies, a more exhaustive
treatment of this issue would be needed to persuade an audience
interested primarily in the relationship between constitutional law
and society (e.g., the boundaries between the federal courts, academic disciplines, and the legal academy).
By focusing attention on the competing sets of resource arrays
in play in this decision, and the nature of the obstacles faced by
Garrett's lawyers, this Article attempts to advance understanding of
the constitutional web in which the ADA is now caught. While dispute over disability rights, before Garrett, had been characterized
by clashing perspectives about the meaning of disability 7 and the
16.
If Chief Justice Rehnquist retired tomorrow and events somehow produced a replacement resembling Justice Steven Breyer, the evidentiary record strategy would be
strengthened for future ADA claims even though the established doctrines remained the

same. Breyer perceives significant institutional differences between the Court and the Congress, see infra notes 130-32, 136 and accompanying text, and with this emphasis on
institutional differences, obstacles are lowered to claims like Garrett's. The outcome in
Garrett was not the inevitable result of established doctrine, but that doctrine supplied pow-

erful, institutional resources for a slim majority whose sense of the case was against Garrett.
If that doctrine were not available to the Garrett majority, ajustification with a recognizable
judicial imprimatur, i.e., an opinion using the language ofjudicial legitimacy, see supra note
10, would have been much harder to build.
17.
In response to court definitions of disability in ADA cases, much of the legal litera-

ture on disability has centered on definitions of disability. Disability legal scholars assert that
court definitions depart significantly from those of the framers of ADA. See, e.g., Burgdorf,
supra note 7; Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of
Disability Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct 68 U. CoLo. L. REV. 107 (1997); Wendy E.
Parmet, Plain Meaning and MitigatingMeasures:JudicialInterpretationsof the Meaning of Disabil-

ity, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53 (2000). Richard K. Scotch, a professor of sociology
and political economy at the Universtiy of Texas, observes that prior to Garrett,"much of the
larger disagreement over the Americans with Disabilities Act can be characterized as a clash
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definition of discrimination,' opposing visions of federalism and
separation-of-powers issues have now been added to the mix. 9 The
Garrett case locates disability law squarely within the Court's enlarging federalism and separation-of-powers jurisprudence. °
Part I of this Article examines argument building and the constitutional landscape in Garrett. Section L.A identifies the low and
high hurdles that confronted Garrett's attorneys as they tried to
argue within the boundaries of the established constitutional landscape. After surmounting the low institutional hurdles, the main
problem was establishing that a broad body of evidence warranted
Tide I of the ADA. Garrett's lawyers cast a wide net, claiming that
multiple categories of evidence were relevant to this Section 5 inquiry.
Section I.B examines one of the few attempts Garrett's supporters made to challenge established doctrine. This was a historical
challenge made by a group of law professors to the Fourteenth
Amendment "state action" doctrine. The Court ignored this argument and the chances are low that the Court will endorse this sort
of historical argument in the near future, however provocative the
evidence presented.
Section I.C examines how Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion used established doctrines as paring tools, essentially paring down the body of evidence that the Court regarded as
"relevant" to the Section 5 inquiry. When Rehnquist was done, very
little was left in the net of Garrett's lawyers.
Part II examines a segment of the pre-Garrettdisability literature,
especially the work of Robert Bugdorf, a law professor, and Anita
Silvers, a philosopher. More specifically, variations are explored in
of perspectives about the meaning of disability." Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 213 (2000).
18.
See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000). Commentators on the conception of equality built
into the ADA have identified the Court's colorblind, equal protection jurisprudence as a
potential problem for supporters of reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. Diller observes that "[m]any of the problems emerging from judicial decisions
concerning the ADA stem from the ADA's reliance on a vision of equality that is particularly
controversial-the principle that differential treatment, rather than the same treatment, is
necessary to create equality." Id. at 40. An element of the case law that makes up colorblind
jurisprudence appears in Garrett, namely, the majority's rejection of "societal discrimination" as ajustification for Title I. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 370-72.
19.
For examples of the Court's rulings that Congress had encroached on states' rights
or separation of powers, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). SeeJeffrey Rosen, The Next Court,N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 22, 2000
(magazine), 74, 76; see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
AntidiscriminationLegislationAfter Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
20.
See Gottesman, supranote 4, at 2.
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how contributors to the pre-Garrett disability literature portrayed
the constitutional landscape in their attempts to build constitutional authorization for disability rights claims. This variation tends
to track, to some extent, membership in the non-legal academy versus the legal academy. Members of the legal academy tend to be
more conversant with specific doctrinal content as well as the "meta"
norms of constitutional argumentation, and this is not surprising
given their institutional training. They also tend to be more likely
than non-legal academics to present elements of the constitutional
landscape that are unfriendly to their claims. For non-legal academics, successful "crossing over" requires adaptation to different norms
of persuasion. The kind of crossing-over at issue here is social theory
to law, not vice versa (though crossing over the other way would require adaptation as well).

1.ARGUMENT

BUILDING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE

A. Arguingfor Garrett Within the Legal Landscape

Briefs filed on behalf of Patricia Garrett and Milton
Ash relied
• 21
primarily on a traditional style of argumentation, which meant
arguing within the established legal landscape. 2 This left the established doctrine mostly unchallenged.23
21.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 10-50.
22.
To argue within the boundaries of the established legal context is to argue in the traditional style. The very definition of an institution (patterned expectations, norms, and
practices) ensures that this traditional style will be predominant. Of course, the boundaries can
be challenged. It is a complex matter to explain the dynamics by which challenges to established doctrines are raised, e.g., Justice Black challenging established Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation doctrine in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (dissenting), rejected,
e.g., Justice Frankfurter in Adamson, 332 U.S. at 61 (concurring), and sometimes absorbed
(challenges to P/essy v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine were absorbed; there was no explicit statement of overruling in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
491-92 (1954) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). Because there is no scientific
definition of "established" doctrine, and because the status of doctrine as "established" is sometimes contested, sociological analysis of the dynamics of doctrinal challenge must not reify the
notion of established doctrine. Complicating matters is the fact that Courts may challenge
doctrine without explicitly acknowledging it. The Warren and Rehnquist Courts have both
framed their decisions in a traditional style, though both Courts have been perceived as activist.
But see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2001) (arguing that the perception of activism ignores the essential partnership between the Court, the
Congress, and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, with all three branches acting in
concert to impose national values on outliers).
23.
There are, of course, variations in the kinds of arguments that might be brought
within the established legal context. The choice to leave established doctrines unchallenged
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For Garrett's attorneys, the current legal context rendered the
traditional style both necessary and highly vulnerable. There were
few easy issues for Garrett's lawyers-i.e., where the resources
available to the Rehnquist majority would not pose threats to their
arguments.
Perhaps the easiest hurdle for Garrett's lawyers was arguing that
the ADA passed the "clear statement" test,2 4 which requires Congress to make perfectly clear its intent to abrogate state immunity.
Footnote three of the majority opinion reads, "It is clear that Congress intended
to invoke Section 5 as one of its bases for enacting
2
the ADA."

5

Distinguishing Seminole Tribe appeared to be a second easy issue.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution could not authorize congressional abrogation of state immunity to claims under that clause. 26 The reason,
according to the majority, was the Eleventh Amendment. 27 Had
Congress relied only on the Commerce Clause in abrogating state
immunity to claims under the ADA, the ADA would have fallen
under Seminole Tribe.

But Congress relied on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which permits abrogration. s Garrett's lawyers made a brief
reference to Seminole Tribe, casting it simply as a case about congressional authority under the Commerce Clause29 (and also
signaling a refusal to challenge it).
might be a result of habit or it might be strategic. Doctrine might be perceived as ungrounded
in history or ungrounded in text, or both, but challenge might be perceived as a hopeless or
unlikely strategy. Challenge is also time--consuming in that it requires extensive research.
24.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v.Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 (1984).
25.
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 n.3 (2001) (citing the ADA at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (b) (4)).
26.
517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
27.
"The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
This language is specific, technical, limited, and does not appear controversial. However,
Eleventh Amendment doctrine dating to Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), holds that a
citizen of a state cannot sue that state, even though the text of the amendment appears to
bar only suits by citizens of another state against a state. In Hans, a unanimous court held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court by citizens against their states
(without the states' consent), even for matters arising under federal law. See id. at 21. The
Hans Court held that the Eleventh Amendment embodied the principle of sovereign immunity. See id. at 11. The context for Hans was debt repudiation by Southern states for Civil
War debts and the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877. It was clear that the Executive branch
would not enforce judgments against states to pay their debts.
28.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 446 (1976).
29.
See Brief for Respondents, supranote 5, at 12 ("[A] t the time the ADA was enacted,
the governing law... was that Congress, when exercising its Article I legislative powers, may
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It would be a mistake, however, to think that the ADA was safe
from Seminole Tribe, for this decision signaled the emergent dominance of a way of thinking about federalism. In City of Boerne' and
Kimel," it became apparent that the Court's federalism jurisprudence was linked to its separation of powers jurisprudence. In
1985, the Court refused even to respond to challenges to the Hans
decision, 32 and the Garrett opinion contains the now-standard one
paragraph statement on the Eleventh Amendment: "Although by
its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by
citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States."
34
3
Citations to Kimel, FloridaPrepaid, Seminole Tribe, and Hans follow.

The "clear statement" rule and the Commerce Clause ruling in
Seminole exhausted the low hurdles for Garrett's attorneys. Their
challenges began with the need to defend Congress' interpretation
of the evidentiary record. The first step was defending Congress'
role in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
Garrett's lawyers had resources to draw upon for this task. There
were clear statements from the voting rights decisions of the 1960s
that Congress had a central role in determining the legislation that
was needed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. "It is for Congress in the first instance to determine 'whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
authorize private party suits against States to enforce the federal law. But this Court has
since ... [held] in Seminole Tribe that Congress is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment
from authorizing private party suits against States, except when exercising its power, conferred in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce by appropriate legislation that
Amendment's substantive provisions. The question whether Congress had § 5 power to
enact the ADA thus obtains.") (citations and footnotes omitted).
30.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
31.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
32.
See Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 n.3 (1985). The Court dismissed Justice Brennan's historical and textual critique of state sovereign immunity doctrine:
Justice Brennan long has maintained that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, . . . is
wrong.... It is a view, of course, that he is entitled to hold. But the Court has never
accepted it, and we see no reason to make a further response to the scholarly, 55page elaboration of it today.
33.
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
669-70 (1999).
34.
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, at 363-64.Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
in Garrtt concluded with a poke at the Seminole decision. "Whether the Commerce Clause
does or does not enable Congress to enact this provision, see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100-85 (1996) (Souter,J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), in my view, § 5 gives Congress the necessary authority." Id. at 976
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
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Amendment.' ,35 In Kimel,3 the Court reiterated that Congress is
not limited to mere legislative repetition of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. "Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter
violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including
that which is not itself
"7
forbidden by the Amendment's text. ,
Garrett's lawyers also called on City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,38 a decision that remarked specifically on the institutional
competence of Congress to deal with disability matters. In explaining its choice for rational tier scrutiny rather than heightened
scrutiny, the Court explained in Cleburne that rational scrutiny
would provide greater flexibility for lawmakers: "How this large
and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult
and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators
guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps uninformed opinions of the judiciary., 39 The complex nature of
discrimination based on disability was a reason for the Court "not
to step out in front of the legislative process in City of Cleburne."'°
While these past decisions affirmed an institutional role for
Congress and were easily available precedent, it was nevertheless
possible to drive a wedge between Congress' institutional role in
theory and how Congress exercised this role in the particular instance of Title I of the ADA. In other words, it was possible to
represent the voting rights decisions as merely the presumptive
35. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 14 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536
(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966))); see also Brief for Law Professors,
supra note 5, at 13 (citing the same passage) ("This Court has in fact gone out of its way to
repeatedly underscore that '[iut is for Congress in the first instance to determine 'whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.'")
(citations omitted).
36.
528 U.S. at 81.
37.
Id. Given the Garrett outcome, it is unclear what the Court means by "a somewhat
broader swath of conduct," since the Court appears to be limiting Congress's power to enforce the Amendment to what is forbidden by Section 1 of the Amendment. See infra notes
130-32, 136 and accompanying text.
38.
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating an ordinance that used mental retardation as a
classification).
39.
Id. at 442-43. Garrett's lawyers stated with respect to disability law, that "as this
Court has recognized, the legislature's superior institutional capacity" to determine remedies "is at its zenith" with respect to disability law. Brief for Respondents, supranote 5, at 38
(citing Cleburne,473 U.S. at 443).
40.
Brief for Law Professors, supra note 5, at 27. "[B]oth the nature of disability and
the nature of discrimination based on disability are complex, and it is in these circumstances that the legislative process is particularly well suited to remediation." Id. at 26. See
also infra notes 130-32, 136, and accompanying text, on defenses of the ADA that center on
the special institutional competence of Congress.
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starting point of the Court's Section 5 analysis, one that did not
guarantee deference to Congress' conclusions. This "wedge" move,
of course, is an attempt to render the voting cases fully consistent
with decisions that strike down Congressional Section 5 legislation.
How could Garrett's attorneys defend themselves from such a
move?
The Court's definition of "relevant" evidence was crucial because the ADA faced a potential separation of powers problem like
that faced by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
in Kimel. 41 In Kimel, the Court determined that there was insuffi-

cient evidence to justify a remedy (the ADEA) and that Congress,
in providing rights under the ADEA, had usurped the judicial role
of defining constitutional guarantees. 2
Briefs supporting Garrett argued that the legislative record of
the ADA easily provided the requisite level of "identified discrimination" to pass the Boerne/Kimel test of "congruence and
proportionality" 43 and thus avoided the usurpation problem.
Garrett's attorneys argued that the record supporting the ADA was
the "polar opposite, 44 of 45that supporting the Age Discrimination
Employment Act in Kimel.
The Brief for Respondents Garrett and Ash divided the evidence
into three major categories. 6 The first category was evidence of
unconstitutional discrimination by state and local governmental
employers. 47 The second category was evidence that identified the
roots of that disability discrimination in feelings of discomfort,
aversion, stigmatization, false stereotyping, and paternalism. 4s The
third category was evidence gathered by Congress of disability discrimination by state and local government in areas apart from

41.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
42.
Id. at 91.
43.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that Section 5 legislation must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end"). The Court associated the congruence and
proportionality test with the Voting Rights cases from the 1960s, although these cases did
not themselves explicitly articulate such a test. Id. at 518.
44.
Brief for Respondents, supranote 5, at 19.
The Court in Kimel invalidated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on the
45.
grounds that there was no evidence of age discrimination that warranted congressional
action. 528 U.S. at 89.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 8.
46.
47.
See id. at 20-25. The brief of Morton Horwitz and others cited the underrepresentation of people with disabilities in state employment. See Brief for Morton Horwitz et al.,
supra note 5, at 5.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 26-36.
48.
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employment (e.g., housing, education, voting, adopting/raising
children, and mistreatment in state institutions). 49
How did Garrett's attorneys and amici defend their expansive
net of relevant evidence? First, they rhetorically buttressed it, stating that the "identified conduct" prong of the two-part test for
Section 5 legislation was "straightforward in concept." 50 The Brief
also attempted to rhetorically suppress any disagreement that
might exist over the ADA. 5' But there were several key substantive
moves that deserve note: (1) the attempt to claim as relevant evidence pertaining to cities and counties, (2) the attempt to deflect a
potential rational-basis scrutiny problem, and (3) the attempt to
deflect a potential "state action" problem.
1. The Attempt to Claim Relevance for Local Evidence-In an important move, Garrett's attorneys attempted to mobilize Fourteenth
Amendment "state action" doctrine to support their inclusion of
incidents involving cities and counties in the evidentiary record,
because local governments count as "state actors" under Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine:52 "Congress found that
employment disability discrimination by State and other public
employers was, at the time of passage of the ADA, a serious and
pervasive problem, rooted in deeply and widely-held prejudices
regarding persons with disabilities." 53 It was important to establish
the relevance of local evidence, as much of the extensive record
before Congress was comprised of this sort of evidence.
Other Briefs included local actions in their discussion of "state
discrimination." For example, the incidents cited by legal scholar
49.
See id at 31-34. The Brief of Morton Horwitz and others similarly included evidence of state discrimination in areas outside state employment. E.g., 1895 CONN. PUB.
ACTS 667 (marriage); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Davidson Acad., 846 E Supp. 611 (M.D.
Tenn. 1994)(education); Boyd v. Bd. of Registrars of Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Mass.
1975) (voting); Bednarski v. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) (parenting); Coalition for Accessible Political Elections, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
VOTER INDEPENDENCE PROJECT, Feb. 1999 (inaccessible polling places and state buildings).
See Brief for Morton Horwitz et al., supranote 5, at 17-22.
50.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 13.
51.
See id. at 10:
There are occasions in the public life of the Nation when the evidence of pervasive
public and private oppression of a group of citizens is so plain and so compelling
that a consensus emerges for a national response in the form of a comprehensive
federal legislative remedy-a consensus that knows no partisan political conflict, no
ideological disagreement, and no Federal/State divide. The enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 was such an occasion.
52.
Id. at 15. The Brief asserted, however, that "much of the evidence relates to
employment discrimination by the States themselves." Id. at 15 n.16.
53.
Id. at 7.
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Morton Horwitz under "Case Law Establishing State-Sponsored
Employment Discrimination" involved local governments (e.g.,
teachers and police officers) . 4 Horwitz et al. also described discrimination in zoning as the 55action of states, although zoning
ordinances are city oriacs
ordinances.

Ths
aeoiatosmk
es
These categorizations
make sense

if state action doctrine is the sorting or categorizing mechanism.
But there are other sorting mechanisms, i.e., the Eleventh
Amendment, as becomes clear in Garrett, and this sorting mechanism puts state and local action
into different categories,
56
rendering local action irrelevant.

2. Attempting to Deflect a PotentialRational-BasisScrutiny ProblemIn building their evidentiary case, Garrett's attorneys might have
worried about a rational basis scrutiny problem.5 7 They tried to
address this potential problem in two ways, namely, by appealing to
the evidentiary record and by declaring certain questions unsettled.5s They argued that Court decisions "establish that at a
minimum the Equal Protection Clause forbids three categories of
public conduct."5 9 The first category was conduct that disfavors
54.
Brief of Morton Horwitz et al., supra note 5, at 6.
55.
Id. at 12-14. Cleburne, for instance, involved a city ordinance. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). The review of judicial opinions on public
housing includes primarily the actions of city public housing authorities. The Brief also
describes discrimination in education as state discrimination, although the vast majority of
the examples cited involved cities and districts. Id. at 14-15.
56.
See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
57.
Garrett's lawyers might have worried that the Court would identify a rational tier
scrutiny problem for the ADA like the one it had identified for the ADEA in KimeL See Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Employer actions based on age, like those based
on disability, are given rational tier scrutiny. See id. at 83. And the common thinking is that
all challenged action survives under rational scrutiny. In Kimel the Court ruled that the
ADEA prohibited action that would be constitutional under a rational tier standard and that
this was prohibited. Id. 528 U.S. at 86. That is, the ADEA was more like "heightened scrutiny" legislation. Id. at 88. As in Kime4 the Court might perceive the ADA as "heightened
scrutiny" legislation creating a gulf between the rights given under the ADA and the rights
given under the Equal Protection Clause. This rational tier scrutiny problem is really a
separation of powers problem because the Court is declaring that Congress has usurped its
role in defining the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
58.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 16. It was unsettled if rational basis scrutiny
was a question only ofjudicial restraint or whether it bound Congress as well. The Law Professors Brief alluded to the institutional difference between Congress and the courts when it
stated that "rational basis review is not a reflection of the severity or pervasiveness of constitutional injuries, but rather of the appropriate branch of government to redress such
injuries." Id. at 21. The Garntt dissenters elaborated a related institutional analysis. See infra
notes 130-32, 136, and accompanying text. Also unsettled, according to the Respondents
Brief, was the question of whether claims of disability discrimination were governed by rational basis scrutiny or by heightened scrutiny. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 16
n.18.
59.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 15-16.
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persons with disabilities that is motivated by negative attitudes or
fears. 60 The second category was conduct that is irrational and/or
arbitrary.6' The third was conduct that treats such persons and
similarly situated groups unequally.1
The potential rational basis scrutiny problem was also addressed
in the Law Professors' Brief (submitted by Professors Susan Stefan,
Robert Hayman, William C. Banks, Daan Braveman, Robert Burt,
Erwin Chemerinsky, John Hart Ely, Martha A. Field, Sylvia Ann
Law, Martha Minow, Martha I. Morgan, and Leonard Strickman) 65
The brief framed Cleburne strategically by emphasizing that under
rational basis review, violations can in fact occur." The professors
defended the ADA by mobilizing the reasons cited in Cleburne for
selecting rational basis standard, e.g., that the rational basis standard permits flexibility. 65 (The Court in Cleburne stated that it was
making the rational basis finding "absent controlling congressional
direction.",66 ) Thus, Garrett's supporters attempted to mobilize Cleburne to authorize a fact-finding role for Congress and to deflect
the "rational tier scrutiny" problem that hobbled the ADEA.
3. The Attempt to Deflect State Action Doctrine--Garrett's lawyers, as
previously noted, tried to use state action doctrine to help their
case (i.e., to argue that city and county governments counted as
"state actors" and thus that evidence involving them should be
considered relevant in assessing the legitimacy of the ADA as Section 5 legislation). 6' But state action doctrine posed a significant
problem for the claim that the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA remedied and prevented Fourteenth
68
Amendment violations.
60.
Id. at 15 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985),
and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
61.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 15-16 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988), and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
79 (1972)).
62.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 16 (citing Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,
613 (1999) and Cleburne,473 U.S. at 439-40).
63.
Brief for Law Professors, supra note 5, at app.1.
64.
Brief for Law Professors, supra note 5, at 22 ("[A]s the Court's decision in City of
Cleburne shows, the rational basis standard of review does not give States a free pass to engage in widespread invidious and arbitrary discrimination.").
65.
See id.
66.
473 U.S. at 439-40.
67.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
68.
See Brief of Morton Horwitz et al., supra note 5, at 5-6 (arguing that reasonable accommodation provisions were necessary given a lack of state awareness about the work
capabilities of persons with disabilities). The Brief for the National Associated of Protection
and Advocacy Systems and United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Garrett, (No. 99-1240) [hereinafter Brief for Nat'l Prot. & Advocacy Sys.], filed on behalf of Garrett, cites many state
failures to provide adequate coverage, accommodation, and protection against false stereo-
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Under state action doctrine, 69 state inaction, e.g., omission to
act 70 or mere state acquiescence, 7 cannot be claimed as a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Garrett's lawyers did not challenge
state action doctrine. They appealed to the low cost of accommoto adopt appropriate
prerogative
dation and Congress'
prophylactic legislation,72 and argued that conduct motivated by
and irrational fears counted as an equal protecnegative attitudes
••
73
tion violation. The Brief of Morton Horwitz et al. classified state
failures to remove architectural and communications barriers in
court as a form of state discrimination,74 without addressing the
state action problem.

types. See Brief for Nat'l Prot. & Advocacy Sys. at 4-7, 12-19. The Brief claims that the findings "capture the essence of what this Court has consistently defined as the violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 10.
69.
See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), for the first full-dress treatment of
"state action" doctrine. For an important though neglected assessment of the ambiguity and
open-ended nature of this case, see Charles Black, Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection,
and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967). Black's article is famous for concluding that state action cases lack analytic coherence and thus are a "conceptual disaster
area." Id. at 95. For historical evidence that the Republican framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood the Amendment to cover at least some kinds of state failures to
act, see FRANKJ. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT'S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 68133 (2001). For a discussion of United States v. Hal4 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871)
(No. 15,282), a lower federal court case stating that "denying the equal protection of the
laws includes the omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection,"
see ROBERT KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1985). So far, the Supreme
Court has not accepted the evidence presented by Kaczorowski and Scaturro.
70.
SeeDeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
71.
SeeBlum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
72.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 38-48. The Law Professors Brief also defended prophylactic legislation under South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966).
"When 'previous legislation has proved ineffective,' broader prophylactic legislation isjustified." Brief for Law Professors, supranote 5, at 20.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 15-16 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
73.
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,448-49 (1985)).
74.
Brief of Morton Horwitz et al., supra note 5, at 24.
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B. Arguing the UntraditionalWay: Challenging
the Established ConstitutionalLandscape

The Law Professors' Brief did challenge state action doctrine.
First the Brief asserted that "traditional concepts of discrimination
developed in the context of race discrimination are not completely
suited as a mode of analysis for people with disabilities."7 5 Following this was a direct historical challenge to state action doctrine.
The Law Professors' Brief argued that the original and historical
understanding of the scope of congressional power under Section
5 supported the validity of the ADA.76 They argued that Section 5
was intended to vest Congress with plenary power to remedy state
discrimination." They also argued that the framers intended to
vest Congress with the power to provide protection that the states
fail to afford.7" The Brief cites Republican interpretations of the
Equal Protection Clause made in 1871, presumably during debate
over the Ku Klux Klan Act, 79 which brought private, racially moti-

vated deprivations of rights under the direct reach of federal
prosecution: "A state denies equal protection where it fails to give
it. Denying includes inaction as well as action."80 And furthermore:
It is said that the States are not doing the objectionable acts.
This argument is more specious than real. Constitutions and
laws are made for practical operation and effect ....

What

practical security would this provision give if it could do no
and nullify the overt acts and legislamore than to abrogate
8
tions of a State? '
The handful of statements cited in the Law Professors' Brief
have never "won" institutionally. The Supreme Court struck down

75.
Brief for Law Professors, supra note 5, at 25. See also Brief for Respondents, supra
note 5, at 39 (arguing that the "nature and dimension" of disability discrimination "does not
bow to a simple general anti-discrimination command").
76.
Brief for Law Professors, supra note 5, at 3.
77.
Id. at 4-8.
78.
Id. at 8 ("The record before the Thirty-Ninth Congress was replete with instances
not merely of official acts of discrimination against the freedmen, but of official failures to
prevent or remedy 'private' acts of oppression, perpetrated under the watch of indifferent
state officials, or with their acquiescence or active support.").
79.
Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
80.
Id. at 9 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Frelinghuysen)).
81.
Id. at 10 (citing CONG GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1871)(statement of Rep.
Lawrence)).
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a key section of this Act as unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth
8 2
Amendment in United States v. Harris.
The Law Professors' Brief did not challenge the historical basis
of the formal equality (anti-differentiation) model of equal protection, but this doctrine might also be challenged on such grounds.8 3
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity might have been challenged as well. Many legal scholars assert that this doctrine is
unsupported by history or text.8 4 The legal criticism of Hans v.
Louisiana (1890), the decision that first established this doctrine, is
surprisingly uniform (surprising, that is, given the division among
Fourteenth Amendment scholars). Justice Brennan launched a
critique of this Eleventh Amendment doctrine in his dissenting
opinion in Atascadero v. Scanlon. 5 According to Brennan, the setfled view of Hans was wrong: the Eleventh Amendment was simply
a diversity restriction and did not apply to federal question jurisdiction; the doctrine of state sovereign immunity articulated in

82.
106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883). Harris held Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes, ch. 7,
§ 5519, 18 Stat. 1067, 1070 (1878), unconstitutional, which had made it a criminal offense
for two or more persons in a state or territory to conspire to deprive any person of the equal
protection of the laws of the State. Section 5519 was originally part of Section 2 of the Act of
April 20,1871. See Harris,106 U.S. at 629; see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (involving an indictment under Section 6 of
the Act of 1870, which in general brought private violations of Fifteenth Amendment rights
within direct reach of the federal government). For arguments that Republicans understood and/or intended the Fourteenth Amendment to cover at least some kinds of state
failures to act, see KAcZOROWSKI, supra note 69, and SCATTURO, supra note 69.
83.
Scholars generally trace the notion of colorblindness to Justice Harlan's famous
comment, "[o]ur constitution is color-blind," in Pessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan,J., dissenting). For an argument that two readings of this comment are possible, an
anti-differentiation interpretation and an anti-caste interpretation, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism and
Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961; see also GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94-95 (Teachers Manual, 1997); ANDREW KULL, THE COLORBLIND
CONSTITUTION (1992).
84.
See, e.g., CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1972); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1987); Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1889 (1983);John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPowerto Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and FourteenthAmendments, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413 (1975); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
98-185 (1996) (SouterJ., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, 1J., dissenting); Atascadero v. ScanIon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
.J., dissenting).
85.
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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Hans was not grounded on text, history, or essential principles of
the Constitution."
In his Seminole Tribe dissent, Justice Souter elaborated on Brennan's argument. Like Brennan, Souter argued that the Eleventh
Amendment did not constitutionalize the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, a common law doctrine dating back to the 1300s, and
that states surrendered sovereign immunity (at least asS7to federal
question cases) in acceptance of the constitutional plan.
Such historical challenges are not consigned forever to defeat.
Things can change. More justices like Souter might arrive on the
Court. Or law students (who become judicial clerks and judges)
might come to get wider exposure to legal scholarship that questions the historical basis for Fourteenth Amendment and Eleventh
Amendment doctrine. There have been instances where the legal
academy has imported "regular" academic history that has undercut official court history, at least in law schools. Eric Foner's history
of Reconstruction became the standard history in the 1980s and
was transported into law schools via the Fourteenth Amendment
legal scholarship of scholars such as Akhil Reed Amar, Robert Kaczorowski, Michael Kent Curtis, and Richard L. Aynes.S8
86.
Id. at 247-302. There is also a great deal of oddness to Eleventh Amendment doctrine that renders it suspect in the view of many scholars. For example: (1) states cannot
consent to a suit under Article III but can under the Eleventh Amendment, see LAWRENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTiONAL LAW 527 (3d. ed. 2000); (2) judicial power under Article III cannot be expanded by consent of the parties, but the Eleventh Amendment, despite
identical language, has been interpreted to allow suit if a state consents, see id.; (3) state
action under the Eleventh Amendment is much narrower than state action under the

Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 535, 557; and, (4) the Supreme Court routinely reviews
state court decisions involving claims against states for damages that raise federal questions,
yet there is no original jurisdiction in federal courts for the same claim.

87.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 150-59. Alexander Hamilton is quoted in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe. See id. at 54, 70, 142-50; see also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 263-80 (1985), (Brennan, J., dissenting). While the
majority quotes only the first sentence of Hamilton's statement below, see Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 54, Souter's dissenting opinion provides the statement in its entirety, emphasizing
Hamilton's point that states surrendered immunity (as to federal question cases) when they
adopted the Constitution:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of

mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed
by the government of every state in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender

of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the
danger intimated must be merely ideal.
Id. at 144 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
88.
See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); KACZOROWSKI,
supra note 69; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment 101 YALE L.J.
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The boundaries between the "regular" academic disciplines, the
legal academy, and the federal courts have been permeable in
some instances. 89 These spheres are not hermetically sealed. Understanding the nature and conditions of that permeability
remains a sociological challenge. If this untraditional, historicallybased style of argument is ever to be successful, it likely will be
when Newtonian conceptions of Court legitimacy, ° under threat
since the 1930s, have been displaced. 9 Inquiries into the nature
and conditions of permeability between academic disciplines, the
legal academy, and constitutional law are much needed. We need
to understand how established constitutional contexts have been
changed via interchange with the academic disciplines and the legal academy. We also need to understand how that interchange
might help establish particular contexts in the first place.
Studies in the sociology of constitutional law would help address
the question of how attempts to defend congressional authority to
pass the ADA came to be so constrained. Such studies, while
contributing to knowledge about the U.S. constitutional system,
might themselves become resources in legal argumentation.
C. The GarrettMajority
We turn now to the Court's response to the arguments of
Garrett's lawyers (the Court ignored the historical challenge to
state action). While Garrett's attorneys sought to cast as wide an
evidentiary net as possible, it became immediately clear that the
ADA faced an evidentiary problem (a Section 5/separation of
powers problem) when the Court confirmed "the long-settled
principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to
define the substance of constitutional guarantees." 92 Ultimately the
1193 (1992); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KEsr L. REv. 627 (1994).
89.
For examples, see the Court's reference to the Brandeis Brief in Mueller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908), and the use of social science in Brown v. Board of Education, 348
U.S. 886 (1954). Court references to law review articles are also not unusual. For an example, see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
90.
See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: the Constitution in
American Culture (1986).
91.
See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 30 (1993).
92.
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
519-24).
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GarrettCourt concluded that "the legislative record of the ADA...
simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of
irrationalstate discrimination in employment against the disabled."9 3
In finding that the record lacked the requirements of irrationality
and state action and included areas beyond employment, the
Court essentially deemed irrelevant large portions of the evidentiary record that Garrett's lawyers sought to include. This was
accomplished using established elements of the constitutional
landscape.
Table 1 represents this paring process. An extended discussion
of Rehnquist's opinion along with relevant citations follows a narrative summary of Table 1.

93.

Id. at 368 (emphasis added).

ConstitutionalDoctrine
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TABLE 1

PRO- GARRETT BRIEFS

Garrett MAJORITY'S PARING
1 TH AND 14TH

TOOLS:

AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

Evidence of discrimination by state and local
government,

Only discrimination by states isrelevant since
only states have 11 th Amendment immunity.
Cities and counties enjoy no 11 th Amendment
immunity from lawsuits.

Evidence of discrimination by state
government inemployment, housing,
education, voting, sterilization laws,
inaccessible polling places, public services,
public accommodations, etc.

Only discrimination in employment (Title I) is
relevant. Discrimination inemployment cannot
be inferred from discrimination inother areas.
Harsh sterilization laws are no longer ineffect.
Public services are covered under Title II.
Public accommodations are covered under
Title Ill. "No party has briefed the question of
whether Title IIof the ADA, dealing with the
.services, programs, or activities of a public
entity' isavailable for claims of employment
discrimination when Title I of the ADA
expressly deals with that subject."

Evidence of discrimination instate
employment including failures to provide
reasonable accommodation.

Failure to provide reasonable accommodation
isstate inaction; only state action iscovered
by the 14th Amendment.
Disability classifications receive only rational
scrutiny, and it is"entirely rational.. .to
conserve scarce financial resources by hiring
employees who are able to use existing
facilities."

Evidence of discriminatory action instate
employment rooted inanimus,
thoughtlessness, and insensitivity,

Only animus defines discrimination under the
14th Amendment (disparate treatment
doctrine). Thoughtlessness and insensitivity
are not actionable.

Evidence of state action inemployment
motivated by animus.

Only official, legislative findings count; cited
instances are "unexamined" and "anecdotal."
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Row 1 identifies the broadest possible net of evidence (evidence
of discrimination by state and local government) and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's use of the Eleventh Amendment to "pare out" evidence of city and county government. Row 2 identifies the next
broadest possible net of evidence after city and county actors have
been excluded (evidence of state discrimination in a variety of areas including employment and voting, along with discrimination
in public accommodations) and Rehnquist's "paring" of most of
this evidence except that pertaining to state employment. Row 3
identifies the next broadest possible net of evidence after Rehnquist
has excluded evidence in non-employment areas and in public accommodations (evidence of discrimination in state employment
including failures to provide reasonable accommodation. Here, the
important move is the attempt to claim state failures to provide reasonable accommodation as an equal protection violation). After
Rehnquist nullifies this move with state action doctrine and a definition of rational action, Row 4 represents the next broadest possible
net of evidence: state action in employment rooted in animus, fear,
and insensitivity. After Rehnquist uses disparate treatment doctrine
to "pare out" all except animus-based action, what is left is represented in Row 5 (evidence of state action in employment
motivated by animus). Even this evidence is subject to exclusion,
for Rehnquist concludes that only official findings are relevant and
that "anecdotal" evidence must be discounted.94
To summarize, the majority cited Eleventh Amendment doctrine
in categorizing evidence of city and county discrimination as irrelevant. 95 The majority referred to Fourteenth Amendment state
action doctrine in making evidence of "the failure to act or the
omission to remedy" inconsequential. 96 Rational basis scrutiny
worked to dismiss evidence where accommodations had not been
provided. The Court declared it rational to "conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing
facilities." 97 The Court used disparate treatment doctrine (ani94.
95.

Id. at 370.
They stated that cities and counties:

are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to rely on [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would
make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the
States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Id. at 368-69.
96.
Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 367-68.
97.

Id. at 372.
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mus/intent) to render evidence of prejudice arising from insensitivity, thoughtlessness, or insecurity, inconsequential."
Other paring tools were used as well, such as demands of proof
and the unwillingness to infer discrimination in one area (employment) from evidence in other areas. What follows is a more
extended discussion of this paring process.
1. Limiting "Relevant" Action to That of States-Regarding the
first issue (the classification of local action as state action) the majority agreed with Garrett's lawyers that the city and county actions
were "state action" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 But this, the majority stated, was not relevant in the present
Eleventh Amendment context. ' The majority argued that it made
"no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part" because cities and counties could be sued under the ADA without
any special Section 5 authorization, since they do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. 0 ' Because Section 5 abrogation of
limited to only
state immunity was at issue, relevant evidence was
0 2
those actions opened to suit by such abrogation.
2. Limiting "Relevant" Action to That of States in EmploymentOnce the majority limited relevant evidence to that which concerned states, it could easily dismiss much of the record assembled
by Congress and cited in the Briefs supporting Garrett. The Court
also discounted historical evidence of egregious state discrimination, arguing that such practices had ceased. In footnote 6, the
Court acknowledged that states in the early part of the twentieth
century adopted the tenets of the eugenics movement and enacted
sterilization laws-laws that were upheld by the Supreme Court
itself in 1927.10 But the majority endorsed the position of the University of Alabama, 0 4 stating "there is no indication that any State

98.
Id. at 372-74; see also id. at 374-76 (KennedyJ., concurring).
99.
See id. at 368-70.
100. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 8).
101. Id. at 368-70.
102. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer rejected this argument, noting that
"[1]ocal governments often work closely with, and under the supervision of, state officials
....Nor is determining whether an apparently 'local' entity is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity as simple as the majority suggests-it often requires a 'detailed examination of the relevant provisions of [state] law.'" Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 369 n.6 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)); see also Brief of Morton Horwitz et al., supra note 5, at 9, 15-17.
104. Brief for Petitioners, Garrett (No. 99-1240), 32-33, 37.
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had persisted in requiring
such harsh measures as of 1990 when
0 5
the ADA was adopted.'

Rehnquist also excluded evidence pertaining to public services
and public accommodations.' 6 Such evidence, in Rehnquist's view,
said nothing about the likelihood of discrimination in state employment. This unwillingness to infer discrimination in
employment from
evidence of discrimination in other areas is im7
portant to note.

It is also important to note that the Complaints in this consolidated case alleged violations of both Tide I and Title II of the
ADA. 0 8 Garrett's attorneys argued that state employees might sue
°9 The
their employers for damages under both Title I and Tide II.'
Court, however, declined to rule on the "constitutional issue
whether Title II, which has somewhat different remedial provisions
from Title I, is appropriate legislation under [Section] 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.""0 The reason was that "no party ha[d]
briefed the question whether Tide II of the ADA, dealing with the
'services, programs, or activities of a public entity,' is available for
claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA ex-

105.
106.

Garrett,531 U.S. at 359 n.6.
Rehnquist stated:

Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in employment.... The
overwhelming majority of these accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the
States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas
are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA.
Id. at 371 n.7. The Court limited the issue in Garrett to the Title I claims of Garrett and Ash
even though Garrett's lawyers made both Title Iand Tide II claims. Id. at 360 & n.1.
107. See infra Part I.C.5.
108. For a description of elements of the Complaints, see Brief for Respondents, supra
note 5, at 1-6, particularly notes 5 and 6 concerning Title II. Title I deals exclusively with
employment and covers private, state, and local governmental employers. It requires reasonable accommodation, which includes making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible and usable. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994). Title II prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities by public entities with respect to any of their
programs, services, or activities. It applies to many areas in addition to employment. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994).
109. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 6 (relying on the Attorney General's
understanding that Title II applies to employment practices of public employers: "In the
case of employment, the Attorney General-who is charged in § 12134 with responsibility
for promulgating regulations to implement Title II-has issued a regulation declaring that,
insofar as the tiles overlap (i.e., in their coverage of employment discrimination by public
employers of 15 or more employees), Title II's substantive provisions are to be interpreted
in haec verba with Title I's substantive provisions.") (citing 28 C.ER. 35.140); see also id. at 6
n.5 (citing the Eleventh Circuit, which shared this understanding).
110. Garrett,531 U.S. at960 n..
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pressly deals with that subject [citation omitted].""' The Court's
refusal to include Title II claims was significant because it worked
as another paring device. The exclusion of evidence involving public accommodations worked to further cut down the evidence
regarded as relevant.
3. Limiting "Relevant" Evidence to IrrationalAction in State Employment--Once relevant evidence was limited to the area of state
employment, the requirement of irrationality was the next paring
tool. Rehnquist cited the requirement of "irrationality" to argue
that the desire to conserve money is rational, and that this justifies
a refusal to provide accommodations. "Several of these incidents
undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make the sort of accommodations for the disabled required
by the ADA. Whether they were irrational under our decision in
Cleburne is more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out of context."' 12 According to Rehnquist, the cost of
accommodations made it "entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial
resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing
facilities. 1 13 Even with the "undue burden" exception of the

ADA,11

"the

accommodation

duty

far

exceeds

what

is

111. Id. The Supreme Court noted the disagreement among the Courts of Appeal on
the question of whether state employees may sue for damages under Tide II, and dismissed
that portion of the writ of certiorari that dealt with this question as "improvidently granted."
Id.It is unclear ifthe Supreme Court simply rejects the view of the Attorney General and
Eleventh Circuit, or ifthe Court's reference to the "somewhat different remedial provisions" of the titles supplies grounds for distinguishing the tiles. (Title I is enforced
pursuant to the remedial scheme of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (1994). Tide II is enforced pursuant to the remedial scheme of Tide VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994)).
112. Id.at 370.
113. Id. at 376. Garrett's attorneys had argued that the cost of accommodation was "often minor" and cited the Congressional finding that "many typical accommodations can be
provided for under $50." Brief for Respondents, supra note 5,at 45. They also tried to argue
that prejudice, not cost, underlay many ifnot most accommodation refusals:
Given the pervasiveness of prejudice against persons with disabilities, when a state actor fails
to do what a civilized and decent society expects, and cites costs that are not
an undue hardship as the ground for rejecting the applicant who would otherwise be
most qualified, there isevery reason to conclude that prejudice and not cost underlies
the refusal.
Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
114. The ADA exempts employers from the "reasonable accommodation" requirement
where the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
42 U.S.C.
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."
§ 121112(b) (5) (A) (1994).
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constitutionally required." 5 The Court, then, used a definition of
rational that would be sensitive to even the smallest of cost-saving
accommodation refusals." 6
4. Limiting "Relevant Evidence" to IrrationalAction in State Employment Motivated by Animus-The animus requirement of
disparate treatment doctrine was yet another paring tool. A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor,
explicitly discusses prejudice against people with disabilities:
"Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice
or hostile animus alone.... There can be little doubt, then, that
persons with mental or physical impairments are confronted with
prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as well as
from malicious ill will."" 7 Indeed, disability activists have long explained how architectural barriers and the like are the product of
thoughtlessness, not animus. But Kennedy and O'Connor then
cite the "intent" standard of equal protection to lessen the constitutional weight of non-animus based action: "The failure of a State
to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new understanding
of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.""" With the invocation of disparate treatment
doctrine, very little was left of the evidence Garrett's attorneys initially sought to include.
5. Limiting "Relevant Evidence" to IrrationalAction in State Employment Confirmed by Official Findings-Even then, Rehnquist
challenged the validity of evidence that had emerged as yet unscathed. Addressing the handful of incidents cited in Breyer's
Appendix C" 9 dealing with state employers, Rehnquist argued that
"Appendix C consists not of legislative findings, but of unexamined, anecdotal accounts of 'adverse, disparate treatment by state

officials.'

,,120

This demand for a very tight fit between remedy and evidence is
reminiscent of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in which the
2
'
Court struck down a set-aside plan in city construction contracts.'
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion (joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun), argued that proof of race discrimination
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
Force on
120.
121.

Garrett,531 U.S. at 372.
See id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374-75 (KennedyJ., concurring).
Id. at 375 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
Breyer's Appendix C listed about 500 submissions made by individuals to the Task
Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. Id. at 390-424.
Id. at 370.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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in the national construction industry, in Richmond housing, voting, and school desegregation, and in uncontradicted testimony of
discrimination in Richmond construction, warranted the conclusion that race discrimination existed in the local construction
1
industry.22
The majority opinion rejected Marshall's conclusion
and demanded proof of discrimination in the local construction
industry. According to Justice O'Connor, writing for the12majority,
there was no reasonable basis for inferring discrimination. 3
O'Connor labeled Marshall's evidence as merely that of "societal
24
discrimination" which was too amorphous to justify a remedy.
(The phrase "societal discrimination" came to be used as a rhetorical tool as early as Bakke v. University of California Regents,125 where
Justice Powell rejected Brennan's appeal to societal discrimination
as a justification for affirmative action plans. 2 6) For Marshall, if
court cases established that people in Richmond used anti-black
sentiments in housing, voting, and school desegregation, and if
anti-black sentiments were proven to exist in the national construction industry, it was more than likely that such sentiments existed
in Richmond's local construction industry. O'Connor, though,
held a different view of race (race-as-culture) which led her to believe that group distributions in jobs were the result of skill sets
and voluntary choices.
Garrett's attorneys had argued that the nationwide scope of disability discrimination justified the ADA, 12 and they coupled this
with a claim that the nature of prejudice against people with disabilities justified an inference that these attitudes existed in state
employment across the nation. "The prevalence of disability
prejudice that Congress found knows no geographic bounds ....

It was more than reasonable for Congress to conclude that the
prophylactics in the ADA should have nationwide application."2
122. Id. at 530-48.
123. Id. at 498-506. O'Connor asserted that there was no reason to assume that minorities would enter the trades in lockstep proportion to their number in the population. For a
critique of O'Connor's "race-as-culture" conception, see Reva Siegel, The Racial Rhetoric of
Colorblind Constitutionalism:The Case ofHopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION 2972 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1996).
124. 488 U.S. at 504, 505.
125. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
126. Id. at 295 n.34, 297 n.36.
127. Respondents cited Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 147, 216, 236, 283-84 (1970),
where eightJustices concluded that it is within Congress' Section 5 power to enact nationwide prophylactic provisions where the evidence before Congress suggests that a problem is
widespread, even though Congress lacks specific evidence that every State has or is likely to
engage in unconstitutional behavior. See Brief for Respondents, supranote 5, at 49.
128. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 49.
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Justice Breyer accepted this argument in his dissenting opinion. 129 In his opinion, justice Breyer criticized the majority for
imposing on Congress the kinds of strict evidentiary requirements
that were appropriate only for courts. It was a matter of institutional difference. 130 According to Breyer: "There is simply no
reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to
the exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions
1
that reflect a court's institutional limitations. "'s
' Drawing on precedent from the voting rights cases and distinguishing between the
institutional competence of Congress and that of the courts,
Breyer argued that Congress could have reasonably3 2concluded that
discrimination in state employment was a problem.
Rehnquist responded to Breyer's institutional analysis by calling
his inference of discrimination "unwarranted." 3 Rehnquist asserted that Congress never made a conclusion that discrimination
by state employers was a problem. He stated that "[a]lthough Justice Breyer would infer from Congress' general conclusions
regarding societal discrimination against the disabled that the
129.

Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 378 (2001) (BreyerJ., dissenting):

The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment throughout society in general,
including discrimination by private persons and local governments, implicates state
governments as well, for state agencies form part of that same larger society. There is
no particular reason to believe that they are immune from the "stereotypic assumptions" and pattern of "purposeful unequal treatment" that Congress found prevalent.
130. Post and Siegel articulate a similar institutional critique of the Court. See Post &
Siegel, supranote 19.
131. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384. Breyer continued:
Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the
magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.... Unlike
courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability
amount to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking constitutional justification....
... [U]nlike judges, Members of Congress are elected.... [W]e, i.e., the courts, do
not "sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations." To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress' legislative power is to stand the underlying principle-a principle of judicial
restraint-on its head.
Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
132. "In reviewing § 5 legislation, we have never required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence that the Court appears to contemplate." Garrett,531 U.S.
356 at 380. Breyer cites Katzenbach, which asked "whether Congress' likely conclusions were
reasonable, not whether there was adequate evidentiary support in the record." Id. (citing
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-56 (1966)).
133. Id. at 372.
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States had likewise participated in such action ... the House and

Senate committee reports on the ADA flatly contradict this assertion." "

According

to

Rehnquist,

these

reports

proved

that

discrimination in private sector employment, public services, and
public accommodations were
the main problem, not discrimina5
tion in state employment. 1

While Garrett lost, it is important to recognize that the legal
landscape did not foreclose an institutionally plausible defense. By
"institutionally plausible" I mean arguments that draw on conventional legal resources, such as precedent and legislative history.
The problem for Garrett's attorneys was not an utter lack of conventional resources. The problem was that their mobilization of
conventional resources was premised on a set of norms for Section
5 jurisprudence that was rejected by a majority of the Court. These
rejected Section 5 practices were tied to the view that there are
important institutional differences between the legislative branch
and the judicial branch. 3 6 The majority's Section 5 norms, however, did not permit Congress greater leeway than the courts in
interpreting evidence. The result was that the legal resources gathered by Garrett's lawyers looked weak and inapposite.

134. Id. at 371.
135. The Court cited a conclusion of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources: "'Discrimination still persists in such critical areas as employment in the private sector,
public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications.'" Id.
(citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989)). The Court also cited a similar conclusion of the
House Committee on Education and Labor. Id. at 371-72 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
2, p. 28 (1990)).
136. See Post & Siegel, supra note 19; see also Brief for Law Professors, supra note 5, at 21
("Rational basis review is not a reflection of the severity or pervasiveness of constitutional
injuries, but rather of the appropriate branch of government to redress such injuries.")
(emphasis omitted). This institutional critique by Post and Siegel (and the Garrett dissenters) easily looks right. But the contexts in which this set of norms was/is articulated should
be kept in mind. The first context is a progressive Court justifying progressive congressional
legislation, i.e., Katzenbach v. Morgan. The second context is a progressive Court minority
seeking to uphold progressive congressional legislation, i.e., Garrett. It is unclear if a progressive Court majority assessing the legislation of a conservative Congress would articulate
the same norms ofjudicial restraint and deference to legislatures. Thus, it is unclear if Post,
Siegel, and the Garrett dissenters would remain convinced of the correctness of this institutional analysis if the ideological compasses of the Congress and the Court were spun
differently.
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LANGUAGE OF EQUALITY AND RIGHTS

AND THE "RULES OF THE GAME"

Part II of this Article shifts gears and turns to the pre-Garrettdisability literature. The language of equality, rights, and
discrimination appears frequently in this literature. This language
is used in the articulation and defense of Fourteenth Amendment
rights for people with disabilities.
As noted, the social model of disability, tied to a theory of justice, was actively forwarded by disability rights advocates in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Advocates succeeded in gaining passage
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974.137 However, the early application
of the social model of disability in the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 is
different in a number of ways from its application in a constitutional context. For example, the 1985 decision Alexander v.
Choate,'38 which upheld reasonable accommodations under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1974, might look to suggest that reasonable
accommodations are also required under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this is not inevitably so, as Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine imposes much tighter constraints on claims than the
stautory provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. Further, it may be
noteworthy that the length of time in which things can change is
much shorter in law than in social theory and philosophy."9 The
year 1985 might look recent or current to a social theorist, though
it may be outdated in law.
As stated earlier, variation exists in the way disability scholars
portrayed the constitutional context in the pre-Garrett literature.
This variation appears to track, to some extent, the institutional
training of contributors to this literature. In the first group are
disability scholars trained in philosophy, social theory, and political
4
science. These scholars, such as Harlan Hahn' and Anita Silvers,1'
use the language of constitutional law (e.g., equal protection and
the Fourteenth Amendment) in making equality and rights claims.
Significantly, they tend to treat these claims as derived directly
from the established constitutional context. They tend not to

137.
(1998)).
138.
139.
140.

Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 357 (1973) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 701
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
Thanks to Doug Dow for this observation.
Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA- Unreasonable Bias or Biased Rea-

soning, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 166 (2000).

141.

See infra notes 160-66, 177-79, 181-82, 186, 188-91 and accompanying text.
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identify nondiscrimination law 4 as a potential obstacle to certain
1
kinds of claims under the ADA.1
In contrast, professors of law143 tend to discuss the limitations of
traditional civil rights law and the difficulties imposed in a postCroson legal context. For example, Matthew Diller states that the
ADA relies on especially controversial notions of equality, and as a
result, "people with disabilities find themselves on the front lines
of a legal and cultural war."'" Diller's work is notable in that it consistently uses phrases such as "conceptions of equality" and "visions
of equality."415 These phrases make clear the contested definitions
of this crucial term. Patricia Illingworth and Wendy Parmet 14 6 explain that the ADA is a hybrid statute, melding positive and
negative rights. Diller, Illingworth, and Parmet are characteristic
members of this group in identifying the "limitations of the civil
rights model"'4 7 and the hurdles inherent in the established legal
context, e.g., the "equal-opportunity-as-negative-rights model represented by Title VII."' 4 In general, law professors tend to show
greater awareness that the social model of disability cannot be
translated in its entirety into the established idiom of constitutional law.
Tort law is a different matter. It is worthwhile to note that a classic article in the disability legal literature byjacobus tenBroeck was
concerned primarily with common law, e.g., negligence and liability and the duty of care owed by common carriers, not
constitutional law.' 49 In an article spanning 79 pages, tenBroek
makes about five references to the U.S. Constitution, 150 including
one specific assertion that the right to bring guide dogs into places
of public accommodation and onto common carriers "[u] ltimately
...may be seen as a mandate of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment." l5' tenBroek wanted the rights secured by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 extended to people with disabilities,
142. See infra Parts I.A.1-LA.3, Part I.C.
143. There are law professors such as Robert Burgdorf, supra note 7, whose work bears
the features of both groups.
144. See Diller, supra note 18, at 44.
145. Id. at 40, 42, 47.
146. Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled: The Relationship between
the Definition of Disability and Rights under the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: ExPLORING IMPLICATIONS, supra note 9, at 3-17.
147. Diller, supra note 18, at 37-47.
148. Illingworth and Parmet, supra note 146, at 8.
149. See tenBroek, supra note 9.
150. Id. at 848, 850, 858, 859,918.
151. Id. at859.
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and he asserted that "integrationism, ... a policy entitling the disabled to full participation in the life of the community and
encouraging and enabling them to do so52 ...is now, and for some
time has been, the policy of the nation."0
Subsequent authors have taken selectively from tenBroek's article. Francis and Silvers cite a handful of statements about the law,
legal rights, and integration as the policy of the nation, although
they do not explain that the rights tenBroek claimed were considerably more narrow than the rights claimed in their edited
collection. 53 Peter David Blanck cites tenBroek's assertion of "integrationalism" as national policy. 54 Robert Burgdorf states,
"tenBroek posited that people with disabilities have a constitutional right to freedom of movement and argued that artificial
barriers that keep such individuals from moving throughout society are illegal."'5 5 For support, Burgdorf cites a passage from
tenBroek's The Right to Live in the World, "noting denial of equal
access to public places is unconstitutional as well as socially and
morally wrong. ", 56 All of these articles misrepresent the handful of
statements tenBroek made about constitutional law as his inquiry
almost exclusively concerns tort law (e.g., his question is: "Has the
law of torts been redirected and remolded according to the prescriptions of the [integration] policy?").,51 My point is not to argue
against tenBroek's statements about constitutional law. It is only to
observe that the current attempt to authorize tenBroek's article
involves suppressing the fact that tenBroek's main concern was tort
law, not constitutional law.
In examining a segment of pre-Garrettscholarship, my goal is to
treat it as a form of work. 158 Like any kind of work, the work of each
group involves cognitive habits, modes of persuasion, modes of
competition, and hierarchies of prestige.
It is a larger project to examine the effectiveness of disability activists' social theory in the constitutional realm. As already
mentioned, it is vital to investigate the boundaries between "regular" academic disciplines, the legal academy, and the federal

152.
153.

Id.at 843.
See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS, supra note

9, at xii-

Xiv.

154. Peter David Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 215
(2001).
155. Burgdorf, supranote 7, at 514 (citing tenBroek, supra note 9, at 849-50).
156. Burgdorf, supranote 7, at 514 n.550.
157. tenBroek, supranote 9, at 847.
158. See Brandwein, Disciplinary Structures, supra note 2, for a treatment of law and
courts scholarship in the academic discipline of political science as a form of work.
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courts. These spheres are not hermetically sealed, but their relationship remains poorly understood. We need to understand how
established constitutional contexts have been changed via interchange with the academic disciplines and the legal academy. We
need, too, to understand how that interchange might help establish particular contexts in the first place. It is certainly possible that
the social theory of activists might have greater impact on future
constitutional cases than it has had on cases of the recent past.
A. Pre-Garrett Discourse on ConstitutionalRights
in the Disability Literature
This section offers an in-depth examination of the constitutional
language of two high-profile academics in the pre-Garrett literature,
Robert Burgdorf and Anita Silvers, a law professor and a philosopher, respectively. Both use the legal language of equality, rights,
and equal protection in their pre-Garrettwork. They are representative in presenting a constitutional claim to reasonable
accommodation for people with disabilities as a claim to legal
equality.
1. Translating the Social Model of Disability into the Idiom of Constitutional Law-Robert Burgdorf explicitly uses language from the
social model of disability in presenting a conceptual foundation
for a right to reasonable accommodation. That is, he uses the language of integration, full participation, a spectrum of abilities, the
role of context in determining impairment, the need for flexibility
in structuring tasks and programs, and the construction of environments according to the needs of "normal" users.159
Silvers uses the social model of disability as well. She describes
the ADA as "making the equal protection guaranteed to citizens by
the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment meaningful to in,161
160
dividuals" with disabilities. She refers to "social arrangements,

159. Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 513-24.
160. Anita Silvers, DisabilityRights, inENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 781, 789 (Ruth
Chadwick ed., 1998); see also SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 7, at 120 ("The ADA constitutes an attempt to make the equal protection guaranteed to citizens by the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment meaningful to
individuals" with disabilities.).
161. SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 15, 34,
76; Silvers, Disability Rights, supranote 160, at 786, 789-90.
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the actions of "the

and the "artificial" disadvantage and ine-

quality imposed by society'" that exclude and bar people with
disabilities.
In all these references, state and private action are grouped together. The state is merged with private society. In the
constitutional context, however, a distinction between state and
private action has been long established. Silvers does not acknowledge this state action problem. 65
The problem, in short, is that the social model of disability conflates state and society.' 6 This might be less important in the
institutional context in which the social disability model was developed. But it is highly important in the constitutional law and policy
contexts in which the model is now applied. The boundaries of the
state certainly may be contested in a theoretical way. However,
once legal argument is entered, the tremendous ramifications of
such a move must be addressed.
2. On Equality and Discrimination-RobertBurgdorf, an attorney and major figure in the disability legal literature, uses the
language of equality and discrimination in casual ways. For example, he uses the terms equal and equality in different senses
without flagging their shifting usage and without noting that one
of his definitions is at odds with traditional conceptions. Compare
two statements: "Nondiscrimination is a guarantee of equality"' 67
162.

Silvers, Disability Rights, supra note 160, at 786; see also SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY,
supra note 7, at 35.
163. Silvers, Disability Rights, supranote 160, at 789.
164. Id. at 786, 789; SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra
note 7, at 14.
165. See supra notes 69-71.
166. In her discussion of rights, Silvers does not distinguish between those held against
state/public actors and those held against private actors:
DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION,

Claims made by and for persons with disabilities as to their rights arrange themselves
in two broad categories, each with its own history and each reflecting a different
model of disability. Into the first category fall rights assigned to compensate impaired
individuals for their natural disadvantages. In contrast, rights encompassed by the
second category protect against artificial disadvantages, those society imposes on disabled people because of their impairments.
Silvers, Disability Rights, supranote 160, at 786.
Silvers is not writing primarily for a legal audience here, and so her readers will likely not
realize that her second broad category of rights must be broken down and the history of
rights against private and state actors distinguished. Even if Silvers uses her own, noninstitutionalized definition of "thick" negative rights, this still does not address the state
action problem under the Fourteenth Amendment.
167. See Burgdorf, supranote 7, at 568.
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and "[E]qual treatment may be a form of discrimination. '1 68 The
meaning of equal/equality cannot mean the same thing in both
sentences, yet Burgdorf does not acknowledge his shifting meanings.
Burdorf identifies two types of discrimination 69 as if this were a
conventional, institutionally accepted delineation. In the first type,
people with disabilities are singled out, made the object of stereotypes, pity, or other negative attitudes, and "shunned," "excluded"
and "otherwise channeled away" from participation.' 70 An example
would be someone rejected for a job because of myths, fears, or
stereotypes associated with disability.
But the term equality, of course, carries not only connotations of
exemption from exclusionary practices but of the actual capacity
to participate. Thus, a second type of discrimination results from
"ignoring the actual differences in mental and physical attributes
and structuring services, facilities, programs and opportunities as if
everyone were an 'ideal user'.... This form of discrimination often stems not so much from prejudice or antipathy, but from
'simple thoughtlessness' and 'oversight.' ,17 Burdorf attributes to
Choate this rough identification of two different dynamics of discrimination. But it is significant that Choate is a statutory case, not a
constitutional case. Burgdorf ignores the fact that this rough identification has not been established in Fourteenth Amendment case
law.
These problems are somewhat surprising, for in an earlier, oftcited article, 72 Burgdorf distinguishes the ADA from prior civil
rights statutes, explaining that the ADA "constitutes a secondgeneration civil rights statute that goes beyond the 'naked framework' of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to

168. Id. at 525.
169. Id. at 517.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citations omitted). See alsoAlexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (noting that invidious discrimination against the disabled is "most often the product, not of
invidious animus, but rather thoughtlessness and indifference.") Referring to Choate,
Burgdorf states: "In analysis that roughly identifies these two different dynamics of discrimination, the United States Supreme Court recognized 'well-catalogued instances of
discrimination against the handicapped' that exist alongside discrimination that is the
product 'of thoughtlessness and indifference--of benign neglect.'" Burgdorf, supra note 7,
at 518.
172. Robert L. BurgdorfJr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991).
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traditional nondiscrimination law." 7 3 Burgdorf refers to a report by
the National Council on the Handicapped,'74 which had outlined:
some of the problems raised by attempting a straightforward
application of legal standards from other laws to the disability
context. Among the problems it discussed were that analysis
under traditional civil rights standards would not account for
some of the key concepts necessary to redress discrimination
against individuals with disabilities-individualized "reasonable accommodations" [and] the removal of architectural,
transportation, and communication barriers in buildings and
'75
other facilities ....
Pamela Karlan and George Rutherglen, more like the early than
later Burgdorf, explain that ADA adopts both sameness and difference models of equality and that 176the difference model has not yet
been constitutionally established.

Silvers' discussions of equality and rights, too, encounter problems. The first results from her use of the language of formalism.
She uses the terms "formal justice," "formal redress," and "formal
equality" 177 and characterizes the ADA as "emphasiz[ing] formal
rather than material equality.'

78

Silvers seeks to establish a robust

conception of formal equality. She states, "the ADA does not reduce equality of treatment to any treatment that is the same. To do
so would
be to impoverish how we conceptualize formal equal79
,,
ity. 1

However, Silvers does not acknowledge that the constitutional
context provides a very different conventional meaning to these
terms. As a result, it looks like she is simply "wrong" when she describes the ADA as emphasizing formal equality. If she wants her
robust conception of formal equality to be persuasive in a legal

173. Id. at 415.
174. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1986).
Burgdorf was the staff author for the National Council on the Handicapped's Report.
175. Id. at 430 n.92.
176. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and Reasonable
Accommodation 46 DUKE L. J. 1, 10 (1996). Karlan and Rutherglen observe that the ADA
contains both sameness and difference models. The sameness part of the ADA can more
easily fit within established constitutional doctrine, or as Karlan and Rutherglen put it, in
.prior legal regimes." Id. at 2.
177. Silvers, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 121, 126, 127.
178. Id. at 120.
179. Id. at 126.
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context, she must at a minimum engage the conventional conception of legal formalism. s°
Silvers presents a right to reasonable accommodation as deriving from a traditional legal conception, namely, negative freedom,
i.e., the right to be free from intrusion:
Although the right to be protected against discrimination
based on one's perceived or actual disability may not seem to
be an aggressively affirmative approach to equalizing, it actually is quite a "thick" right. For the ADA famously designates
as discriminatory failures to adjust environments that otherwise exclude the participation of qualified individuals with
disabilities. So equal protection here gives people with physical, sensory, and cognitive limitations claim under American
law to extensive modifications of existing practices and sites
that currently debar them ....
Failure to provide accommodation illegitimately impinges on
the negative freedom of disabled users. That is, the absence
of access to transportation limits impaired people's ability to
compete for employment and other social goods.... As an
expression of the right to equal protection, the ADA requires
that the disabled be given at least whatever access is readily
achievable...

11

This "thick" negative conception of rights, however, is not
smoothly derivative from the legal context, a context that includes
state action doctrine.
Patricia Illingsworth and Wendy Parmet have
2
pointed this out. 1

In another context, Jennifer Nedelsky, a political scientist, traces
this traditional negative conception of rights back to the framers

180.

On legal formalism, see Ruth Colker, The Anti-SubordinationPrinciple:Applications, 3

WisC. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 59-60 (1987), reprinted in D.

WEISBERG, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:

288 (1993) ("[I]t is often the principle of anti-differentiation [that underlies
equal protection doctrine]. The anti-differentiation principle seeks a color blind and sex
blind society where racial and sexual differentiations do not exist." (citation omitted)).
Colker discusses equal protection jurisprudence and the anti-differentiation model in the
context of disability-based discrimination in Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quaqmire,47 UCLA
L. R. 653 (2000).
181. Silvers, Disability Rights, supra note 160, at 790. A similar statement about negative
freedom appears in SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supranote 7,
at 127.
182. See supra note 146.
FOUNDATIONS
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and examines how the notion of rights as limits or boundaries rests
on a flawed conception of autonomy. 1 3 This conception is "captured, amplified,
and entrenched by its association with
8 4
property.1
The primary content of this conception of autonomy was protection from the intrusion and oppression of the collective.
The autonomy the Madisonian system sought to protect could
be achieved by erecting a wall of rights between the individual
and those around him. Property was the ideal symbol for this
vision of autonomy, for it could both literally and figuratively
provide the necessary walls. The perverse quality of this conception is clearest when taken to its extreme: the most
perfectly autonomous man is the most perfectly isolated.
When the understanding of autonomy changes, the relation
between the individual and society looks different, and the
conceptual structure of constitutionalism must shift.
A proper conception of autonomy must begin with the recognition that relationship, not separation makes autonomy
possible. This recognition shifts the focus from protection
against others to structuring relationships so that they foster
autonomy.... The whole conception of the relation between
the individual and the collective shifts: the
collective is a
85
source of autonomy as well as a threat to

it.1

This sort of analysis is crucial in the disability rights literature.
When Silvers articulates her conception of thick negative rights,
she expands the traditional conception of what counts as
an intrusion or exclusion. While she keeps the traditional term
"negative," she substitutes the traditional conception of
autonomy/intrusion with a conception from the social model of
disability, and she collapses a distinction relevant in Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine between state and private society.
Silvers is a philosopher, and her contributions to the literature
are concerned with democratic morality and what she calls "rectificatory justice."'" 6 When she steps into the legal arena, her roots in
theory promise to bring new and useful vocabularies to legal dis183. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism:
the Madisonian Framework and its Legacy (1990).
184. Id. at 272.
185. Id. at 272-73.
186. SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 139.
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cussion. sIndeed,
a Burgdorf/Silvers conception of equality may be
"richer"' 7 and more just. But if it is clear that democratic morality
and justice "require[ ] us to act affirmatively by enlarging the artificially depressed social opportunities available to people with
physical, sensory, and cognitive impairments," 8 it is not clear that
the constitutional context permits a smoothly derived legal justification.
3. On Sources of Authority-The work of Robert Burgdorf and
Anita Silvers is similar also in that both identify pieces of the legal
context that are hospitable to their conception of equality, i.e., one
that includes reasonable accommodation. Neither, however, engages major elements of the legal context that are largely
inhospitable. To the extent that inhospitable elements of the legal
context are not engaged in the disability rights legal literature and
to the extent that they are suppressed in representations of the legal landscape, constitutional arguments in favor of reasonable
accommodations will not likely persuade judges.
Silvers refers to certain elements of the legal landscape to justify a right to reasonable accommodation: the Architectural
Barriers Act of 1968,189 the Air Carriers Access Act of 1986,19° and
in another context, Lloyd v. Regional TransportationAuthority. 91 But
these are the elements of the legal context that are friendly to the

187. Diller, supra note 18, at 44.
188. SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 17.
189. See id. at 118; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-54, 4154a, 4155-57 (1994).
190. Silvers cites the 1986 Air Carriers Access Act as legislation related to the ADA that
"offers added insight into the discrimination against disability that must be arrested if the
disabled are to increase their social participation." Silvers, DisabilityRights, supra note 160, at
790 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41705); see also SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 125. Again, the Air Carriers Access Act is certainly on the books. But
in order to legitimate a "thick" negative conception of rights, Silvers must engage the entire
legal context, especially the post-Croson (1989) landscape in which the formalism of Scalia
and Rehnquist emerges forcefully.
191. In a philosophical essay, Silvers examines the usefulness of a politics of recognition
for people with disabilities. In the course of arguing that responsiveness to difference is
necessary and does not entail the privileging of any group's perspective, Silvers offers a
concrete example drawn from legal doctrine. She writes, "recent [U.S.] civil rights history
illustrates that, to be meaningful, equality must be responsive to difference." Anita Silvers,
Double Consciousness, Triple Difference: Disability, Race, Gender and the Politics of Recognition, in
DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE 78 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser
Marks eds., 1999). As evidence she refers to the circuit court case Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 E2d 1277, (7th Cir. 1977), in which the Seventh Circuit ruled that
public transportation systems have an affirmative duty to provide wheelchair lifts. While
Lloyd is certainly part of case law, it is not representative of recent U.S. civil rights history.
Silvers' characterization of the legal context here is overly broad.
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conceptualizations of the social model of disability. The unfriendly
elements are ignored. These friendly elements, too, are largely legislative.
For his part, Burgdorf consistently cites the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights 192 as legal authority to establish that courts have largely

misread concepts underlying disability nondiscrimination statutes.
He adds that "Congress and other governmental bodies have come
down solidly" in favor of integration and full participation. 93 He
also provides citations to the Senate Committee report in 1974,19
provisions of the U.S. Code, 195 and Regulations to Implement the
96
Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA.1
These sources of authority and legislative history are without a
doubt appropriate and essential to Burgdorf's argument. Again, it
is significant that none of them are judicial. When Burgdorf does
cite cases, they tend to be state cases or statutory cases from the
pre-Crosonera. 197

In 1991, Burgdorf also identified the Commerce Clause as a
source of constitutional authority for the ADA. This was a way, he
thought, to get around the problem state action doctrine poses to
the application of the ADA to the private sector.198 Given that he
was writing before the recent federalism cases, his broad rendering
of doctrine on this subject is understandable. It also may not have
been apparent in 1991 that Croson marked a significant shift in
constitutional law.
The bulk of the writing by Silvers and Burgdorf considered
here, however, is recent. The unfriendly elements of the constitutional context have been apparent for many years. Largely
unaddressed in their writings is the deep institutionalization of the
192. U.S. Comm'n On Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983).
193. Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 514-15 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (b) (B) (1994), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8) (1994)).
194. Id. at 514 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 34 (1974)).
195. Id. at 514-15 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 701(a) (b), 29 U.S.C. § 760(i), and 29 U.S.C.
§ 796).
196. Id. at 529 (citing 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1997)).
197. For example, he cites the Supreme Court of Washington, stating, "[i]dentical
treatment may be a source of discrimination." Holland v. Boeing Co., 583 P.2d 621, 623
(Wash. 1978); see also supra notes 159, 171-75 and accompanying text.
198. See Burgdorf, supra note 172, at 497 ("Given the broad scope of congressional
authority under modem interpretations of the commerce clause, particularly in prohibiting
discrimination, restrictive conceptions of congressional authority to guarantee equal access
to public accommodations are anachronistic."). He cites Laurence Tribe, who noted in
1988 that "[c]ontemporary commerce clause doctrine grants Congress such broad power
that judicial review of affirmative authorization for congressional action is largely a formality." Id. at 497 n.454. Of course, since Seminole Tribe, the Court has reigned in Congress'
Commerce Clause power.

FALL 2001-WINTER 2002]

ConstitutionalDoctrine

traditional, negative conception of rights and the conceptions of
intrusion and autonomy to which that conception of rights is tied.
4. Reasonable Accommodation and Affirmative Action-In Alexander v. Choate, 99 a unanimous Court (which included Rehnquist
and O'Connor) upheld a reasonable accommodation provision,
stating that reasonable accommodation "relates to the elimination
of existing obstacles against the handicapped."200 In School Board v.
Arline, the Court declared: "Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped
employee."2 1° Indeed, Burgdorf cites both of these cases 2 in both
his 1991 and 1997 articles. But both of these cases were preCroson. Moreover, they were statutory claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, not constitutional claims under the ADA.
This discussion of Choate and Davis should not be construed as
an argument against reasonable accommodation as a constitutional right. Rather, my argument is that disability activists are
"constructing" Choate as they attempt to make it authority for constitutional claims to reasonable accommodation. In other words,
Silvers' and Burgdorf's citations and readings of Choate as authority
for their claims do not emerge directly or inevitably from the text
of the case itself. In fact, the case itself can be easily interpreted to
provide little benefit for their constitutional claims.
A footnote in Choate is particularly significant. In this footnote,
the Court attempted to clarify language 20it 3had used six years earlier
in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.

In Davis, a case involving Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1974,04 Justice Powell wrote for a unanimous Court, frequently
using the language of affirmative conduct and affirmative action.
He used this language in discussing whether Southeastern was required under Section 504 to modify its program to permit
participation by the plaintiff and disabled people generally. Powell
stated
situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory.
Identification of those instances where a refusal to accommodate
199. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
200. Id. at 300 n.20.
201. 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987).
202. See Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 460, 530; Burgdorf, supra note 172, at 417, 450.
203. 469 U.S. at 300-01 n.20 (clarifying Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)). See infra text accompanying note 206.
204. 442 U.S. at 402 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 ed., Supp. III)).
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the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination
against the handicapped continues to be an important responsibility of [the Department-of Health, Education, and
Welfare]

205

In Choate, Justice Marshall's opinion (again for a unanimous
Court) included a footnote that referred back to Davis' use of affirmative action language. Marshall responded to criticism of the
use of this language in Davis. He wrote:
Regardless of the aptness of our choice of words in Davis, it is
clear from the context of Davis that the term 'affirmative action'
referred to those "changes," "adjustments," or "modifications" to
existing programs that would be "substantial," or that would constitute "fundamental alteration Es] in the nature of a program ...
rather than 206
to those changes that would be reasonable accommodations."

In the previous footnote, Marshall had stated, "the ultimate
question is the extent to which a guarantee [of federal funds] is
required to make
reasonable
modifications in its programs for the
1 .
1201
needs of the handicapped.
Thus, it would appear from Choate that the Court distinguished
affirmative action from reasonable accommodation. However,
Choate does not establish this distinction once and for all. Contrary
to Marshall's assertion, it is not clear in Davis that the term affirmative action
applies
only
to changes that are substantial and
fundmentl
an
"208
fundamental and not just reasonable.
More importantly, post-Croson formalism makes the Choate footnote vulnerable. There are indications that reasonable
accommodation is regarded not as the "usual" nondiscrimination
° In Doll v. Brown, the
duty but as something more. 211
Seventh Circuit
205. 442 U.S. at 412-13.
206. 469 U.S. at 301 n.20 (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 299 n.19.
208. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 409-12.
209. See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 E3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[The ADA
does not require] affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of
requiring that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who
are not disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with
disabilities, no more and no less."); Pierce v. King, 918 E Supp. 923, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1996)
("Although framed in terms of addressing discrimination, the Act's remedial provisions
demand not equal treatment, but special treatment tailored to the claimed disability.");
Robinson v. City of Friendswood, 890 E Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that the
purpose of ADA is to ensure that individuals with disabilities "receive the same treatment as
those without disabilities" (quoting Chiari v. City of League City, 920 E2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.
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stated: "[T] he Rehabilitation Act imposes on federal employers a
positive duty... of accommodation to any known physical or mental handicap of a qualified applicant or employee, as well as the
usual negative duty of nondiscrimination. 1 0 Claims to reasonable
accommodation run against the grain of a negative conception of
rights, and this conception of rights is at the core of legal liberalism.
In sum, the attempts of Burgdorf and Silvers to claim reasonable
accommodation as a constitutional right, i.e., their conceptions of
discrimination and rights and their sources of legal authority for
these conceptions, will likely be unpersuasive to judges for reasons
having nothing to do with old, medical conceptions of disability.
This is because they do not engage the established elements of the
constitutional context that are inhospitable to their claims. If Silvers and Burgdorf want to persuade judges, they must engage this
context, i.e., they must adapt to the "meta" norms of constitutional
argumentation.
III. CONCLUSION
Just a few years ago, Matthew Diller forecasted an inhospitable
legal context for claims to reasonable accommodation:
The ADA relies on notions of equality that have proven to be
especially controversial. The ADA's requirement of "reasonable accommodation" rests on the idea that in some
circumstances people must be treated differently from others
in order to be treated equally. This "different treatment"
form of equality has long been contested and in the context
of affirmative action has met with deep resistance from the
courts.11

It is now clear that Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment doctrines pose institutional obstacles as well. It is vital that studies be
done of the complex processes by which the historically questionable doctrines of state sovereign immunity and state action,
mobilized by the Court in Garrett,came to be institutionally dominant. Such studies would help illuminate the nature of the
1991))); Emrick v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 875 E Supp. 393, 398 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("[I]t is
the aim of the ADA to merely ensure equality and not preference to disabled employees.").
210. 75 F.3d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1996).
211. Diller, supra note 18, at 23.

80
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difficulties involved in translating the social model of disability into
the idiom of constitutional law. Garrettwill make it more likely that
the constitutional landscape will receive greater and more detailed
attention by disability activists. This, however, guarantees no legal
"wins" for the ADA, as the attorneys for Garrett and Ash, experts in
constitutional law, recently discovered.

